Security Intelligence Records in New Zealand : A Case Study
"But who watches the watchers" – Juvenal, Satires, vi 347
Rachel Lilburn
Lecturer
School of Information Management
Victoria University of Wellington[Originally published in Archifacts April-October 2003]
Introduction
Does a democracy need secrecy, and if so, why, and for how long? Unfortunately, New Zealand’s security intelligence agencies compare poorly with similar agencies worldwide who have been far more proactive concerning opening their records for inspection. An assessment of the state of disposal of, and access to, security intelligence records in New Zealand is presented below; cases, past and present are used to illustrate the issues faced by our country’s public archival institution, Archives New Zealand, as well as by archivists and records managers. Possible actions needed to redress these issues are then discussed.1
The following cases and issues illuminate the role of a public archives in supporting government and historical accountability not only through disposition processes, but also through the negotiation of appropriate storage and access arrangements, with resources to ensure that inadequate arrangement and description, and storage, are not impediments to transfer. Strong legislation underpins the role of accountability, which can often only be enacted through the dedication and active involvement of professional recordkeeping bodies. Finally, the political support and will given by our elected representatives to archives legislation, and more open government, is essential.
Under present public archives legislation, the Archives Act 1957 s.15, no records created or maintained by a government office may be destroyed or disposed of without approval of the Chief Archivist, head of our public archives institution, Archives New Zealand.2 The security intelligence agencies fall within the definition of a government office.
It is a fact that very few internal and external security monitoring agencies’ records have been subject to formal appraisal, and transfer to Archives New Zealand. Nor have these agencies been magnanimous in allowing access to their records, while under their management, through the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA) or the Privacy Act 1993.3 Meanwhile, our government has enacted, and drafted, more security-related legislation under the guise of needing to protect the country against terrorist threats in the wake of 9/11, notably the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, the Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Bill and the Counter-Terrorism Bill. If freedom of official information is a cornerstone of democracy, then the balance between a possible need for greater national security and this fundamental freedom is perceived by some to be jeopardised, "with snooping into people’s private lives the norm".4 One might assume that New Zealand would be subject to few, if any security threats. The most recent incident was the bombing of the Greenpeace ship, Rainbow Warrior, by French secret agents in 1985. In addition, a Labour government may be expected to be left-wing and liberal in its views, especially one led by a Prime Minister who has infuriated US President, George Bush, on several occasions with her anti-Iraq war statements, and thus who may be expected to encourage a more open access policy to records involving matters of national security.5
Not so. Well-known local activist, author and specialist on security related activities, Nicky Hager, states that, "New Zealand, like many similar countries, is in the midst of a period of very ‘right wing’ politics . . . although the tide is beginning to turn . . . [and] although there are some decent and socially-concerned people at the highest levels of government, this government clearly feels constrained from making more than quite minor changes to the far-right policies introduced since 1984." 6 Hager discerns a trend, even in a relatively free country such as New Zealand, towards secrecy-based and public relations driven government. He is well-qualified to make that judgment, having personally used the Official Information Act hundreds of times over the period in question, and recently failing in an attempt to obtain records about the two new surveillance laws mentioned in my introduction.7 In particular, he cites intelligence agencies as being at the extreme end of the spectrum, withholding virtually all their papers on often-flimsy grounds.8 While space constraints preclude a detailed discussion of what public documentation is available from these agencies, for example in the form of annual reports and other documents, there is evidence to conclude that such documentation is also heavily censored from both the public and the monitoring agencies established to oversee security intelligence policy and planning. Hager also alleges that even Prime Ministers over time have been informed on an unwritten ‘need to know’ basis.9
New Zealand Security Intelligence Agencies
The security intelligence sector in New Zealand, looking after the welfare of four million people, is currently made up of the following agencies:
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New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (SIS) – responsible for domestic security;
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Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) – responsible for signals intelligence and advice on electronic security and technology;
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Center for Critical Infrastructure Protection (CCIP) – responsible for providing advice and support to protect New Zealand’s critical infrastructure from cyber-threats;
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External Advice Bureau (EAB) – responsible for researching and assessing overseas developments with possible impact on New Zealand interests;
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The Directorate of Defence Intelligence and Security (DDIS) – responsible for the New Zealand Defence Force’s intelligence and security.
The Prime Minister is currently the Minister in charge of these agencies. Her policy advisory body is the Domestic and External Security Secretariat (DESS). A committee of senior officials, the Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Co-ordination (ODESC), also carries out oversight of the activities of these intelligence community agencies.
However, limited access to security intelligence records is now a major bone of contention for politicians, journalists, activists, archivists and, increasingly, historians, who are disturbed not only by the unavailability of records of events which occurred over fifty years ago, many concerning individuals long since dead, but also at the possible destruction of these records without referral to the Chief Archivist.10 Two cases pertinent to the issue of security intelligence agency activity with public records will now be examined: the first occurred in 1974, the so-called Nash case, and the second in 2002.
The 2002 Case
In late-2002, thirty-one political scientists and historians had become sufficiently infuriated by lack of access to Security Intelligence Service (SIS) archives that an open letter on the matter was sent to the Prime Minister, as head of security intelligence activities. The letter urged the Prime Minister to instigate a review of access to the archives of the SIS, stating that the "archival policies of much of the former Soviet bloc are currently more open and unrestricted than those of New Zealand." The letter went on to say, "in the interest of scholarly research into New Zealand’s foreign and defence policy and its place in the world and in the interest of a more open and democratic society . . . we ask the New Zealand government to bring the SIS in line with its international counterparts".11
The letter, instigated by Dr Anne-Marie Brady, Lecturer in Political Science at Canterbury University, was the culmination of many frustrating years she had experienced in endeavouring to obtain access to files on China-New Zealand relations in the 1940s, 50s and 60s. This material was required for her biography of Rewi Alley, a New Zealander who had spent many decades in China working on philanthropic activities. Alley was a suspected communist in the eyes of the New Zealand government.12
Inspection of her correspondence with the SIS, dating back eight years, reveals an uncompromising interpretation and application of the OIA legislation. For example, the SIS would neither confirm nor deny the existence of information on Alley or other matters, as allowed under s.10 of the OIA, and continued to cite reasons of national security under sections 6(a) and (b) for withholding access. Brady’s appeals to the Ombudsman and the Prime Minister proved futile. At the same time, Brady was being given the full co-operation in her other research on New Zealand-China relations in the 1950s by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), which was systematically declassifying documents to enable their use. Yet the current Director of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, Richard Woods, stated in a letter to Brady that, "[t]o date no Service records have been released to the public . . . . The only records held by the New Zealand SIS that have been released to the public pre-date the formation of the Service. A very limited amount of this material . . . has been made available to academics".13 Copies of the open letter were sent to the national dailies, and stories duly appeared in The Press and The Dominion Post. In addition, a five minute interview by the host of the National Radio network show, Nine to Noon, was conducted with Brady on 13 November 2002.14 The Prime Minister’s reported reply to the allegations was that "[c]ontrary to the assertion in the open letter, releases by other security and intelligence agencies are quite selective and significant areas of information are withheld . . . in Australia, Britain and Canada." Furthermore, the Prime Minister said, "[t]he New Zealand SIS does not withhold information without good reason."15
Archives New Zealand did not respond publicly to Brady’s public call for better accessibility to security intelligence archives and the need for investigation of allegations that the Security Intelligence Service in particular had destroyed certain records. However, at the Archives New Zealand Consultation Group meeting of 11 December 2002, the Chief Archivist, when queried by this paper’s author as to why this was so, responded that the institution "was working actively with the SIS and that such work was not necessarily known to users or the media [and that] . . . the Prime Minister led the public response." Unwritten public service rules suggested it would be inappropriate for the Chief Archivist to comment further. The Chief Archivist was also out of the country when the story broke. Another senior member of the profession, Stuart Strachan, Hocken Librarian, also present at the meeting, commented that "by not responding to negative news like the destruction of documents, it appears the organisation is indifferent or lacks authority or standing", to which the Chief Archivist replied that such "agencies are often dealt with through direct contact, as it is not always appropriate to go through the media."16
Further investigation for this paper has revealed, however, that progress has been made with security intelligence records, despite Archives New Zealand lack of public comment. In stark contrast, the ‘Nash case’, almost thirty years earlier, highlighted major problems in the leadership and administration of New Zealand public archives. It was, in fact, one of the roots of change that finally bore fruit in the year 2000 with the granting of independent departmental status to National Archives.17
The ‘Nash case’
In the 1970s National Archives, as it was then known, was a fledgling but undernourished institution, with a small staff and a Chief Archivist who reported to a public servant three times removed from the Minister of Internal Affairs. It was an institution with no political clout or influence. Sir Walter Nash had been Prime Minister of New Zealand. Upon his death, his papers, occupying a double garage in a Wellington suburb, were eventually removed to National Archives, whereupon the eminent historian Sir Keith Sinclair, in writing the Nash biography, used them.18 This was despite minimal arrangement and description, and therefore control of access to the content of the papers, having been undertaken.
Prior to final publication in November 1976, the SIS demanded that three passages be deleted from the book (printed but as yet unbound), as they were based on documents owned by the SIS and found among Nash’s papers.19 The publisher refused and the passages were not deleted, but by 1 April 1976 SIS records originating from the Nash papers had already been removed to the registry of the SIS. The then Prime Minister, Rt. Hon. Robert Muldoon, in response to a question in the House, preferred the word ‘returned’, for ‘removed’, stating, "[w]hat did happen was that certain reports of a highly classified nature were returned to the SIS, as the originating department, for safe custody".20 The action was defended on the grounds of protocol; that is, that all SIS documents be returned to them once read by the Prime Minister and that Nash had, therefore, wrongly retained these records. When further queried as to the nature and extent of the ‘removal’ the Acting Prime Minister denied that the SIS removed papers and stated that it did not ask for permission to search the collection. Instead "the Chief Archivist did, however, deliver to the . . . Service 32 papers which had originally emanated from the Service."21
The removal actions were also supported by a legal opinion from Crown Law. When, in 1994, I requested, under the Official Information Act, a copy of the opinion, dated 19 August 1976, my request was turned down on the basis that the information I had sought "is of a category that should be withheld under s.9(2)(h) of the Act, on the grounds that the withholding of information is necessary to maintain legal professional privilege". The Solicitor-General went on to say that he had also borne in mind the security considerations arising from the opinion and that public interest considerations did not outweigh either criteria.22 The Nash case received considerable publicity (and undoubtedly boosted book sales). Perhaps the SIS did have some justification for removal of the papers. An important issue raised by the case was the question of ministerial documents in private political papers and their ultimate ownership. Perceptions that the Chief Archivist and the institution she headed, the National Archives, had been bullied into returning these papers, and that the confidence of potential depositors would be seriously undermined by the incident were highlighted in the public debate. In his Listener editorial, Vincent O’Sullivan also raised the vexed question of historical accountability if the SIS were allowed to remove the Nash documents.23
Concern was expressed by the then President of the Archives and Records Association of New Zealand, Thomas Wilsted, about the inadequate accommodation for the institution, one of the reasons given for the necessity of the removal, and the lack of staff to process the collection which could have identified this material and made it secure from inappropriate access. Wilsted called for the urgent instigation of a declassification procedure in order that security intelligence agencies need not defer deposit. He flagged this issue as the one on which most of the discussion should hinge, and it is an issue that, to this day, has not been addressed.24
Minutes of a private meeting held by National Archives staff on 2 November 1977 record dismay about the lack of documentation as to what was removed; not being privy to the Crown Law opinion; conflicting statements made by the Chief Archivist to staff; her lack of a public response, and so on. It was the ‘final straw’ in a series of incidents that had occurred at National Archives in those years and had considerably weakened staff morale.25 Probably unbeknownst to staff (as its existence was surprisingly not noted in the aforementioned minutes) was a disposal schedule for SIS records, signed by the Chief Archivist and the Head of the Service in 1974, three years before the Nash case, which would appear to give the SIS the right to destroy all vetting files, as well as classified and non-classified material from New Zealand government agencies, overseas sources and personal files. The job file for the schedule has absolutely no paperwork on how the schedule came about.26
In 1977 the Archives and Records Association of New Zealand invited Dr Wilfred Smith, Dominion Archivist of Canada, to visit New Zealand to write a report containing recommendations on future archival development and legislation. This invitation was a response, in part, to the perception of a lack of leadership by New Zealand’s public archives institution.
Recent developments
Progress towards greater regulation of disposal of some security intelligence archives has been made, in part due to the relatively new independent status accorded to Archives New Zealand, and a commitment by the new Chief Archivist and staff to redressing the problem. The Head of Appraisal Services, for example, was disturbed to read the following comment in the publication Security in New Zealand Today: ". . . the Service is authorised by the Government’s Chief Archivist to regularly purge its files of personal information which is assessed as being no longer of security significance."27 The Chief Archivist wrote to the Director of the SIS in 2001 suggesting that the terms of the Schedule drawn up in 1974 were outdated and should no longer be used. It was a moot point as to whether the Schedule was revocable, as it did not contain an expiry date. Archives New Zealand offered to develop, in consultation with the Service, a new schedule. The New Zealand SIS agreed to cease destruction of all records at this point.28
A new schedule for the vetting of records has been developed and is about to be put into operation, pending approval. Interestingly, the retention rate recommended is very low; one linear metre, "reflecting the routine administrative nature of the records appraised," while two hundred and ten linear metres are recommended for destruction.29 Classes recommended for retention include information on people vetted who have made an historically important contribution to New Zealand; precedent setting cases; and cases which resulted in appeals or reviews of a decision. The retention period is left to the judgment of the SIS, as is the determination of historically significant people; the latter, a responsibility for which the Service expressed an interest.
The Chief Archivist has held meetings with the heads of the major security agencies, (in her opinion possible largely because of Archives New Zealand’s improved status). She also states that there is a lot of support, including from the GCSB, "for the development of retention and disposal schedules that are in the public domain".30 Elsewhere it is stated that Archives New Zealand hopes these initial discussions "will facilitate further projects in the security sector".31 These actions have resulted in the appraisal and scheduling of various registered and unregistered filing systems of the Domestic and External Security Secretariat, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DESS). Approximately half of the records are recommended for retention.32 Furthermore, it has been reported that the SIS is developing an archives policy. In a recent newspaper feature article, the "SIS director Richard Woods [says he] doesn’t want to comment on the proposal till it has been announced by Prime Minister Helen Clark, but it is likely to be finalised this year."33
According to a letter from the Prime Minister received by Dr Brady, the policy "envisages that information on people and organisations will be eligible for release fifty years after the death of the person and, in the case of subject files, fifty years after the creation of the document". But the Rt. Hon. Helen Clark also admits that there will be provisos for longer withholding periods if significant security or privacy concerns remain or, if under s.(18)(f) of the OIA, there would be substantial collation of documents or research required. "The Service must necessarily balance various priorities. It is unrealistic [she says] to expect the Service to release all records as soon as they become eligible . . . ."34
Ongoing Issues
A number of issues and questions, some old and some new, are raised by the previous comments about the state of security intelligence records. They include:
In Brady’s open letter to the Prime Minister, she notes the existence of a Ministerial Certificate under s.8(2)(c) of the Archives Act, exempting deposit of SIS records on the grounds of national security, which did not require the approval of, or discussion with, the Chief Archivist. This expires in 2005. Politicians, particularly from the Green Party, lost no time in using the opportunity to ask written questions in the House of Representatives about the nature of this exemption and others that may have been given to security agencies. It was discovered that the GCSB also has an exemption, issued in January 2002 for a period of 25 years, for an unspecified number of cryptologic records in GCSB’s custody or control.35
Under the proposed Public Records Bill, about to be drafted by the Parliamentary Counsel Office, the current provision for varying coverage of the legislation (or "varying agencies or records out of transfer") by the mechanism of Order in Council will continue, with some changes. The decision to defer deposit on national security grounds will be removed. In addition, the Minister cannot make a unilateral decision. There has to be significant consultation and public scrutiny. Also, security intelligence agencies will not be able to be removed wholly from the operation of the act by Order in Council. It will not be possible to be "varied out" of two provisions: the requirement to make and keep full and accurate records and the disposal provision. It appears, too, that the Chief Archivist will be able to specify how these records will continue to be cared for and managed.36
On the matter of transfer of custody, appraisal reports for the SIS and DESS note that, while schedules now exist, they do not specify transfer of custody. Therefore, access will continue to be administered by these agencies within the terms of the Official Information Act and the Privacy Act. However, Archives New Zealand also flags, in the aforementioned appraisal reports, the probable need for formal negotiations in the future over the complicated issue of physical transfer of highly classified material and what form secure storage should take. Archives New Zealand has a secure stack (with swipe card access) in which it stores some sensitive Defence records, but it would require significant upgrading to meet requirements for the storage of highly classified material.37
Protocols for working with security agencies have been identified as a necessity by Archives New Zealand; for example, the security clearance level required of the appraisal archivist should be ‘Top Secret’ (As a result of the September 11 tragedy, ironically, there is also a significant backlog of archivists to be vetted by the SIS). To complicate matters, initial discussion and the development of a draft document by Archives New Zealand staff while engaged in the SIS appraisal has revealed that the various security intelligence agencies view themselves as having distinct and different roles, and handling different intelligence information.38
A major area of debate has been whether the appraisal reports for these agencies should be restricted or open documents, due to the possible inclusion of classified material in, for example, the archivists’ notes concerning file content. Archives New Zealand intends eventually to make its appraisal reports electronically accessible to the public through the GLADIS System (Government Locator and Archival Descriptive Information System). The institution’s preference is for as much openness as possible.
Archives New Zealand has also commented on the problem of lack of systematic declassification of security intelligence records. For example, it is noted in the DESS report that "apart from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), there is little evidence of systematic records declassification within the security intelligence community, despite several agencies holding records pre-dating World War II. This has led to increasing pressure on space, and almost certain unauthorised records destructions".39
Summary and Conclusions
The now independent Archives New Zealand has shown that it is neither prepared to be intimidated by the security establishment, nor lacks the will to act decisively on occasion; for example, to stop the possible illegal disposal of security intelligence records. However, it must be equipped with legislative powers adequate to deal with security intelligence archives, their disposal, custody, transfer, management and access. As has been discovered during the course of the use of the Official Information Act, legislation alone could be an insufficient safeguard against a security intelligence culture in New Zealand that has demonstrated an unwillingness to co-operate with the concept of open government. "When push comes to shove" a considerable amount of moral persuasion is also required by the Ombudsman, says one journalist.40
The observations of a former New Zealand Chief Archivist, Ray Grover, adds another perspective to the difficulties that public archives may have in achieving their goals with security intelligence records. Archivists must seize opportunities, he says; "choose the strategy for the time and area, the tactics and the weaponry for the ground, and keep ahead on intelligence".41 As Archives New Zealand appears to have recognised, success with security intelligence archives is more likely to come through following this approach and being prepared to build networks and alliances, rather than by publicly harassing them. Security intelligence agencies may, in fact, be forced to consider transfer of records to the institution due solely to lack of space! Secondly, Grover reminds us that public archives institutions should remember that restrictions placed on records, whether they be placed by bureaucracies or archivists, breed resentment among our supporters, the users. "It also qualifies our role in an open society" and, sooner or later, public archives in a market economy will find themselves paying the price.42 Thirdly, public archives must balance the need to be accountable to stakeholders and supporters with vision: "[a] vision that will keep in view the values we hold and the fundamental role we play in an open and civilised society. A vision that will lead us to persevere through the compromises and knockbacks."43
The battle over improvements in access to security intelligence archives is far from over, with the possible transfer of records now scheduled for retention into Archives New Zealand’s custody probably still a "twinkle in their eye". Change will not occur without political pressure, commitment and will, such as has been exhibited by the Green Party. Their interest in security intelligence records could be crucial to the final state of the Public Records Act on the "varied out of transfer" provisions and the resourcing of improved secure storage. Resources must be forthcoming for a declassification process to commence as soon as possible, and on an on-going basis. However, given the comments of the Prime Minister, it would seem that this is still a matter for discussion.
Nor will change occur without a concerted effort by, and coalition of, archives and records professional bodies, individuals, political scientists, historians and activists who want to use these records. By not engaging in the debate, archivists and records managers will be tacitly supporting the status quo and those in power who choose to mislead the public, believing that a democracy survives on never-ending secrecy. Let us remind ourselves again that archivists and recordkeepers are not impartial custodians, but are the active documenters of society and shapers of social memory.
Ultimately, the societal risks of recordkeeping accountability failures, as McKemmish points out, will result in the inability of societal watchdogs to call to account governments and individuals.44 Nowhere is this more important than with the records of security intelligence agencies, which have significant power to ruin the lives of innocent people.45
Endnotes
1 The unqualified support given by Archives New Zealand staff to this paper, as directed by the Chief Archivist, is hereby acknowledged. I am also grateful for the considerable assistance of Dr Anne-Marie Brady, Lecturer, Political Studies, Canterbury University, who provided copies of her extensive correspondence with the NZSIS, the Ombudsman and the Prime Minister, Rt. Hon. Helen Clark, regarding access to SIS records.
2 Archives Act 1957, Section 15(1). Public archives not to be destroyed or disposed of without authority of Chief Archivist –
1. No person shall destroy or otherwise dispose of, or authorise the destruction or other disposal of, any public archives of any kind whatsoever that are in his possession or under his control, except with the consent of the Chief Archivist given in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
3 A principle of the OIA is that information should be made available unless there is a good reason for withholding it. The Privacy Act 1993, protects information about living individuals. An excellent summary of the provisions of both acts and a comparison with other countries can be found in the document by Paul Bellamy, Access to Official Information, Background Paper No.27, Parliamentary Library, May 2003.
4 The Green Party, for example, believes that this and other legislative amend-ments amount to an attack on our privacy and civil liberties. See: http://www.greens.org.nz/campaigns/sis/ [Accessed 9 April 2003].
5 Jane Clifton, "It’s Only Words," NZ Listener 189, no.3291 (June 2003): 16-17.
6 Nicky Hager, "Seeking the Truth: The Power and Politics of Using Archives and Records," Archifacts (October 2001): 14-15.
7 Ibid., 18-19.
8 Ibid., 21.
9 See Nicky Hager’s chapter, "Who Watches the Watchers? Overseeing the Intelligence Agencies", in his Secret Power: New Zealand’s Role in the International Spy Network (Nelson: Craig Potton, 1996).
10 In a phone conversation with Dr Anne-Marie Brady, 8 April 2003, she mentioned that a colleague, writing on the New Zealand Communist Party, had been told by the New Zealand SIS that the 1951 Waterfront Lockout papers had been destroyed. She thus stated this in her interview with Linda Clark on National Radio’s Nine to Noon show on 13 November 2002, whereupon Brady tells me that the SIS faxed Clark to say that this was not the case.
11 "Open Letter to the Prime Minister and Minister of State Security, the Honourable Helen Clark, on Opening the SIS Archives to Scholarly Research", November 2002.
12. Anne-Marie Brady, Friend of China: The Myth of Rewi Alley (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003).
13 Letter to Dr Anne-Marie Brady from E.R. Woods, Director of Security, 24 January 2002.
14 Tara Ross, "Call for Access to Archives," The Press, 12 November 2002, 4; Michelle Quirke, "Researchers Denied Access to SIS Archives," The Dominion Post, 19 November 2002, 2.
15 Michelle Quirke, "Researchers Denied Access to SIS Archives," The Dominion Post, 19 November 2002, 2.
16 "Minutes, Archives New Zealand Consultation Group Meeting, Wellington" (11 December 2002), 4, photocopied. Stuart Strachan was made an Honorary Life Member of the Archives and Records Association of New Zealand in 1988, was in charge of appraisal services during his stint at National Archives, is a regular contributor to public debate, and is widely considered to be a most influential member of the profession.
17 This occurred under the Archives Culture and Heritage Reform Act 2000.
18 They were nearly 14 tons in weight and filled two hundred and thirteen metres of shelving, according to the article, "The Nash Estate," Archifacts n.s., no.1 (February 1977): 2. The book by Keith Sinclair was titled, Walter Nash, (Auckland: Auckland University Press and Oxford University Press, 1976).
19 "Auckland Writer Censored by SIS," The Week, Issue 12, 10 September 1976, 1.
20 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, vol.413, August 23 – September 21 1977, 2592-3.
21 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, vol.413, August 23 – September 21 1977, 2945.
22 Letter from Solicitor-General, J.J. McGrath, to Rachel Lilburn, "Crown Law Opinion on Nash Papers: Request Pursuant to the Official Information Act 1982", 25 February 1994, Ref: PVT122/56.
23 Vincent O’Sullivan, "The Resources of History," New Zealand Listener, 29 October 1977.
24 Homas Wilsted, "Underneath the Archives," New Zealand Listener, 17 December 1977.
25 "Minutes of a Meeting held 2 November 1977, at . . . Wellington. Purpose: To Document Some of the Inefficiencies & Malpractices Found to be Occurring or Having Occurred at National Archives in Recent Years," photocopied, 8 pages.
26 See Archives New Zealand file, NA 2/66/2 Records Disposal: New Zealand Security Intelligence Service – Schedules, 1974–2001 (Restricted File).
27 The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, Security in New Zealand Today (Wellington: NZSIS, 1997): 18.
28 Conversation with Eamonn Bolger, Head of Appraisal Services, 30 May 2003. Appraisal of public records is a contestable service in New Zealand. Therefore, it is possible that the SIS could have conducted its own appraisal, although the report and recommendations would remain subject to the Chief Archivist’s approval. The implications of this scenario are all too obvious. See also Draft New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Appraisal Report, Job No.2003/0625.
29 Draft NZSIS Appraisal Report, Job No.2003/0625.
30 Email to Rachel Lilburn from Dianne Macaskill, Chief Archivist, 29 May 2003.
31 Appraisal Report, DESS, Job No.OP 2001/46, 2.
32 Ibid., 21.
33 Diana McCurdy, "They’re Keeping Our Secrets," The Dominion Post, 23 May 2003, B5.
34 Letter to Dr Anne-Marie Brady, from Prime Minister, Rt. Hon. Helen Clark, 2 December 2002.
35 Keith Locke, MP, Written Question No.16639, 19 December 2002 to the Minister responsible for Archives New Zealand. The relevant section of the Archives Act 1957 is:
8. Deposit of public archives in National Archives –
2. Notwithstanding anything in subsection (1) of this section, –
a. Where the Chief Archivist is satisfied that the deposit in the National Archives of any particular public archive of the age of 25 years or over would unduly prejudice the effective administration of any Government office, he shall defer the deposit of that archive for such period as may be agreed upon between the Chief Archivist and the administrative head of the Government office affected:
b. Where any public archive is required by any enactment to be kept secret or confidential, or where the administrative head of the Government office having the possession or control of any public archive satisfies the Chief Archivist that by reason of its secret or confidential nature it would not be in the public interest immediately to deposit that archive in the National Archives, the Chief Archivist shall from time to time defer the deposit of that public archive for such period as may be agreed upon between that administrative head and the Chief Archivist:
c. Where the Minister in charge of any Government office certifies that in his opinion any specified public archive or specified class of public archives in the custody or control of that Government office contains information the release of which may adversely affect the national security of New Zealand or relations between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of any other country, the deposit in the National Archives of that public archive or of public archives of that class shall be deferred for such period or shall be made subject to such conditions as to access or otherwise as that Minister from time to time directs:
d. Where the deposit of any public archives in the National Archives is deferred as aforesaid, the Chief Archivist may prescribe any conditions he thinks fit to ensure the safe preservation of any such archives during the time they are kept in a Government office.
3. Any public archives deposited under subsection (1) of this section may be deposited unconditionally or, if the administrative head of the Government office making the deposit so requires, shall be deposited subject to such conditions as to access and otherwise as may be agreed upon from time to time by the Chief Archivist and the administrative head of that office.
4. Where the administrative head of any Government office and the Chief Archivist are unable to agree as to whether or not the deposit of any public archives in the National Archives should be deferred or as to the period for which that deposit should be deferred or as to the conditions as to access and otherwise on which any public archives should be so deposited, that question shall be determined by the joint decision of the Minister and the Minister in charge of that Government office, and the decision of those Ministers shall be final.
36 According to the Frequently Asked Questions page on the Archives New Zealand website regarding the Proposed Public Records Bill, the Order in Council process involves: developing policy, consulting within government, and obtaining approval from the Cabinet Legislation Committee, Cabinet and finally the Executive Council before the Order is signed by the Governor-General.
See: http://www.archives.govt.nz/archivesnz/press_releasesproposed_public_records_bill_frame.html [Accessed 3 April 2003].
37 Greg Goulding, Archives New Zealand Security Officer/ Head of Policy and Planning bases this judgment on the national Protective Security Manual, which provides rigorous specifications for such material (itself a classified document). Conversation with author.
38 Conversation with Eamonn Bolger, Head of Appraisal Services, 30 May 2003. Approval to give me access to the SIS Draft Appraisal Report was given by the Service Director himself.
39 Appraisal Report, DESS, Job No. OP 2001/46, 3.
40 Deputy Editor of The Evening Post, Karl du Fresne, makes this observation in his paper, "The Right to Know: A Media Viewpoint", Archifacts (October 1996): 189.
41 Ray Grover, "The Realpolitik of Archives", Archifacts (October 1996): 102.
42 Ibid., 103.
43 Ibid., 106.
44 Sue McKemmish, "The Smoking Gun: Recordkeeping and Accountabilty", Archifacts (April 1999): 1-15.
45 See the article by Richard Hill on this topic of access versus privacy, "‘Secrets and Lies’ in Official Files", Archifacts (October 1996): 95-207.
